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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY 
5 July 1962 
SUBJECT: SNIE 13-5/1-62: CHINESE COMMUNIST SHORT-RANGE MILITARY 
INTENTIONS 
THE PROBLEM 
To assess the significance of the Chinese Communist military buildup 
in the Foochow Military Region facing the Taiwan Strait. 
NOTE 
This Estimate supplements SNIE 13-5-62, "Chinese Communist Short-
Range Military Intentions," dated 20 June 1962, on the same subject. 
THE ESTIMATE 
1. At the time when SNIE 13-5-62 was approved on 20 June, .Chinese 
Connnunist armed forces had moved into the Foochow Military Region in large 
numbers. There had been no public announcement of the move, and no 
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propaganda manif'estations by the Chinese Communists which appeared to have 
any relationship to it. Neither were there any other clear indications of 
the purposes and motivations which might lie behind it. The Chinese 
Communists did have sufficient reason to take seriously the possibility 
of incursions by GRC forces in the coming months, and they had of course not 
abandoned their claims to Taiwan and the offshore islands. 
2. Soon after 20 June news of the Chinese Communist military buildup 
appeared in the Western press, accompanied by statements of concern about 
Peiping's intentions. Chinese Connnunist propaganda then began vigorously 
to attack the Chinese Nationalists and the US, accusing them of a con-
certed intention to invade the mainland, but placing no stress on the 
nliberation" of the offshore islands or Taiwan. No movements of major 
military units into the Foochow Region were noted subsequent to 17 June. 
On 23 June Chinese Connnunist Ambassador Wang sought out US Ambassador 
Cabot in Warsaw, probably in order to discover what he could of US inten-
tions. He was told that the US would not support a Chinese Nationalist 
attack on the mainland under present circumstances, and was also warned 
of the risks involved in a Chinese Communist attack on the offshore islands. 
US statements and Press Conference remarks by the President reaffirmed 
earlier declarations of US policy on the issues involved. Movements and 
increased readiness of US forces accompanied these statements. 
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3. Although these developments have changed the situation considerably 
they still do not permit a firm estimate of the motivations which lay behind 
the military buildup. A plausible mterpretation is that the Chmese 
Cormnunist leaders were seriously concerned with the possibility of a GRC 
incursion, perhaps with US support, on the mainland at a time of considerable 
unrest, and that they accordingly moved enough forces into the area to deter 
such incursions, to cope with them if they occurred, and to be in a position 
to attack the offshore islands if such a course seemed desirable, possibly 
in connection with repelling Nationalist landings on the mainland. They 
may also have had various expectations of political profit to be made when 
the troop movement became known, the reactions to it registered in the 
world, and the US attitude tested. This interpretation of the Chinese 
motives does not exclude the possibility that offensive action was under 
consideration prior to the US reactions. 
4. Whatever the original motivations of the Chinese Communist mili-
tary buildup may have been, world attention has been focused again on the 
Taiwan Strait issue, and a declaration of attitude and policy has been 
issued by the US. Publicly, the Chinese Communists proclaim their dis-
belief in the US disclaimer of support for GRC intrusion on the mainland, 
and they probably do remain somewhat uncertain of US intentions. Yet the 
US statement probably diminished their fears of such attacks. It must 
also have encouraged them to hope for serious friction between the US 
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and the GRC. Finally the Chinese Communists have used the situation to try 
to arouse the mainland population from its lethargy and perhaps to reduce 
the chances of local support for any possible Chinese Nationalist landing. 
5. The magnitude and scope of the military buildup have increased 
the offensive as well as the defensive capabilities of the Chinese Communists, 
and we still cannot dismiss the possibility of a full-scale assault on the 
offshore islands. However, the element of surprise has been largely lost, 
and the risks of the enterprise have been confirmed by US policy statements 
and precautionary measures. For the near future, therefore, we think that 
the odds are against such an attack. The Chinese Communists might under-
take raids or small-scale attacks on one or another of the smaller islands 
held by the Nationalists, but there would be danger of escalation even in 
such actions and we doubt they would consider the gains worth the risk. 
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